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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 In May 2001, petitioner George Anthony Ross was 
convicted of third degree murder after his third trial on 
the same charge.  Ross unsuccessfully appealed his 
conviction and sought relief under Pennsylvania‟s Post-
Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-46.  
Ross then sought federal habeas corpus review under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, raising Constitutional claims under the 
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Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  The District 
Court denied Ross‟s petition, and we granted a certificate 
of appealability.  Among other issues, Ross argues that 
his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated 
when the trial court admitted prior testimony from an 
unavailable government witness, even though Ross did 
not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness 
with newly-discovered impeachment evidence.  For the 
following reasons, we conclude that the Confrontation 
Clause is not the proper avenue for relief on Ross‟s 
claim.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 This case arises out of a murder that took place a 
decade and a half ago.  On December 31, 1996, Cheo 
Stevenson was shot dead while riding in a jitney in the 
Northside section of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Ross was 
implicated in the shooting, and was charged with 
criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and carrying an 
unlicensed firearm in violation of the Uniform Firearm 
Act.  On June 4, 1997, Ross was tried before a jury in the 
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  On June 6, 
1997, Ross‟s first trial resulted in a mistrial.  Ross was 
re-tried, and on October 30, 1997, a jury found Ross 
guilty of all three charges.  Ross appealed his conviction, 
and on May 31, 2000, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
granted Ross a new trial.  This third trial, which began on 
May 1, 2001, is the subject of Ross‟s habeas petition and 
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the instant appeal. 
A. 
 At the third trial, the Commonwealth opened its 
case-in-chief with testimony from Jonathan Smith, who 
was riding in the jitney along with Stevenson at the time 
of the shooting.  The Commonwealth then called to the 
stand a series of witnesses who testified about the crime 
scene, and the results of various laboratory tests that were 
performed on objects found at the scene. 
 Finally, the Commonwealth called Randy Erwin to 
the stand.  At the second trial, Erwin had testified that 
Ross, whom he had met at the Allegheny County Jail, 
confessed in jail to shooting Stevenson.  At the third trial, 
however, Erwin refused to testify on the ground that he 
feared retribution if he were to testify.  The 
Commonwealth inquired as to Erwin‟s willingness to 
testify, asking whether Erwin would testify if ordered to 
do so.  Erwin repeated that he would refuse to testify: 
Q Would you explain to the Judge, 
please, if that is in fact what you would 
intend to do on [sic] this case, that you 
would not give any testimony? 
A I will not give any testimony. 
  Q And if I call you to the stand while the 
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jury is in the box, can you answer the 
questions that I pose to you? 
A No, sir -- no, ma‟am. 
 . . .  
  Q And Mr. Erwin, I ask you again if I 
call you as a witness in this case, do you 
intend to give testimony against Mr. Ross? 
A No, ma‟am. 
Trial Tr. at 110:5-12, 112:3-6. 
 On cross-examination, Erwin suggested that 
despite his reluctance, he might testify if he was ordered 
to do so.  The Commonwealth clarified this suggestion 
on re-direct: 
Q . . . [Defense counsel] has now asked 
you if you‟re called to the stand and the 
Judge tells you to testify, are you going to 
answer the questions that I ask? 
A No, but I didn‟t understand the way 
he was putting it.  I don‟t want to be 
responsible for refusing to the Judge [sic].  I 
don‟t know the circumstances behind that, 
but I don‟t want to testify in the case. 
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THE COURT: Let me cut to the heart of 
this. Mr. Erwin, if the Commonwealth calls 
you to the [stand], is it your present 
intention not to respond to any of the 
questions, correct? 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
Id. at 117:14-22.  Erwin also stated that he suffered a 
lapse of memory and would not be able to testify even if 
ordered to do so.  Id. at 118:16-19. 
 The trial judge found Erwin unavailable over 
defense counsel‟s objection.  The unavailability 
determination having been made, the trial judge allowed 
Erwin‟s testimony from the second trial to be read into 
the record.  At this point, defense counsel had failed to 
proffer any reason why Ross might not have had a full 
and fair opportunity to cross-examine Erwin at the 
second trial.
 1
 
                                                 
1
 At oral argument before this court, Ross‟s attorney 
suggested that counsel had, in fact, raised the issue of 
newly-discovered impeachment evidence, discussed in 
Part IV.B, infra.  When pressed on this point, Ross was 
unable to provide a citation to the record demonstrating 
this point and requested permission to file a follow-up 
brief.  Ross‟s follow-up brief, along with an independent 
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 After Erwin‟s testimony was read to the jury, the 
trial judge permitted the Commonwealth to read into the 
record Erwin‟s prior convictions which, under 
Pennsylvania law, were classified as crimen falsi 
convictions.  The Commonwealth read to the jury the 
date and name of each conviction: 
[Prosecutor]: Thank you, Your Honor.  
Your Honor, I‟ll read the date and the crime 
of crimen falsi.  
First on June 10 of 1987, burglary.  
October 2 of 1987, burglary.  On March 25 
of 1990, receiving stolen property and retail 
theft.  On April 3 of 1995, receiving stolen 
property and retail theft.  And on May 31 of 
1996, two cases of theft.  And that would be 
the extent of the crimen falsi. 
                                                                                                             
review of the record, make clear that Ross‟s counsel 
misspoke at oral argument.  While the record shows that 
Ross did object to the judge‟s unavailability 
determination, it does not indicate on what basis the 
objection was made.  Trial Tr. at 120:10-15.  Nothing in 
the record suggests that Ross raised the issue of newly-
discovered impeachment evidence before the trial judge 
allowed Erwin‟s prior testimony to be read into the 
record. 
 8 
 
Trial Tr. at 142:17-143:1.  The Commonwealth did not 
include in its list Erwin‟s prior conviction for making a 
false report to law enforcement.  Nor did Ross‟s counsel 
introduce this omitted conviction.  The Commonwealth 
then rested its case. 
 After presenting testimony from the driver of the 
jitney in which Stephenson had been riding at the time of 
the shooting, Ross‟s counsel requested a sidebar with the 
trial judge to discuss the admissibility of testimony from 
Thomas Thornton.  Thornton, an inmate who was 
allegedly housed next to Randy Erwin, was Ross‟s only 
remaining witness.  Thornton intended to testify that 
Erwin fabricated his testimony regarding Ross‟s 
confession.
2
  The trial judge found that Thornton‟s 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay under Pennsylvania 
law and excluded his testimony from trial.  With no 
witnesses left to call, Ross rested his case. 
 
                                                 
2
 Although Ross asserted at trial that Thornton was 
housed next to Erwin, the record on this point is unclear.  
The Commonwealth noted at trial that “if you check the 
computer it appears [Erwin and Thornton] were never 
lodged in the same prison at the same time, [where] they 
could have had the opportunity to discuss anything with 
each other . . . .”  Trial Tr. at 172:13-17. 
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B. 
 After closing arguments, the trial judge delivered 
the jury charge and allowed the jury to deliberate.  After 
approximately two and a half hours of deliberation, the 
jury indicated to the court tipstaff that it had reached a 
verdict.  Before the verdict could be recorded, however, 
one juror asked to speak with the trial judge. 
 The trial judge held an in camera conference with 
the single juror, counsel for both sides, and a court 
reporter.  Ross himself was not present at the conference.  
At the conference, the juror voiced concerns about 
retribution should she vote guilty, identifying a spectator 
at the trial who may have recognized her: 
THE TIPSTAFF: Are you afraid of 
something happening to you or your family?  
[Juror]: . . . I‟m just saying that I‟m 
afraid because I know members, people of 
that sort of background. 
THE TIPSTAFF: Do you know people in 
the courtroom? 
[Juror]: There was one guy that was 
standing outside, I went to school with him 
and I‟m just saying by him knowing me, 
they could say, well, okay, I know your 
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sister, your sister stood up for jury duty and 
she testified against a killing of so and so 
and so and so. . . .  
THE COURT: . . . .  What I asked you 
was whether or not you were fearful of any 
repercussions. 
[Juror]: I mean, Judge, I am. 
. . . 
THE TIPSTAFF: Do you think because 
you were here and you were on this jury that 
somebody who maybe come [sic] in or out 
of the courtroom or was associated with this 
case may do something to someone that you 
know? 
[Juror]: Of course. 
THE TIPSTAFF: That‟s what you‟re afraid 
of? 
[Juror]: . . . [I]f I was on the jury and 
they were sitting in the audience . . . if there 
was somebody . . . that was sitting in the 
audience that knew me they could say, okay, 
she made a statement . . . so we‟re going to 
make a statement against her.  They go 
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hand-in-hand like that. . . . And I just don‟t 
want to make a statement against someone 
that may hurt me.  Later on down the line, 
that‟s like me putting my foot in my mouth 
and saying, okay, I‟m killing myself. 
Trial Tr. at 266:12-268:15; see also Trial Tr. at 258:24-
259:2; 262:20-21.  Throughout this conference, the juror 
continued to voice her belief that Ross was guilty of the 
charged crime.  See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 254:10-11 (“I feel 
that he is guilty on his accounts which he was wrong for 
doing in God‟s eyes.”).  The juror never equivocated on 
the issue of Ross‟s guilt. 
 The trial judge reminded the juror several times 
that her job was to vote to convict or not to convict, 
regardless of Ross‟s race.  The trial judge also tried to 
allay the juror‟s fear of retribution by telling her that no 
juror in any case he had ever tried had been threatened 
after delivering a verdict.  The trial judge then instructed 
the juror to return to the courtroom to record the verdict. 
 After the juror left the in camera conference, 
Ross‟s counsel moved for a mistrial.  The trial judge 
denied the motion.  Counsel, the court reporter, and the 
trial judge reconvened in the courtroom, with Ross and 
the twelve jurors present.  The jurors, who were 
individually polled by the court to ensure the verdict was 
correctly reported, unanimously convicted Ross of third-
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degree murder. 
C. 
Ross timely appealed his conviction.  On October 
23, 2003, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed 
the judgment.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
denied Ross‟s petition for allowance of appeal. 
Having exhausted his direct appeal, on March 9, 
2005, Ross petitioned for relief under Pennsylvania‟s 
Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 9541-46.  The PCRA Court denied Ross‟s petition on 
the merits.  Ross appealed, and the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania affirmed.  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania again denied Ross‟s petition for allowance 
of appeal. 
 On September 24, 2009, Ross timely filed for 
federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  On December 2, 2009, 
the District Court denied Ross‟s petition on the merits.  
The District Court declined to issue a certificate of 
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 
 On August 26, 2010, we granted Ross‟s 
application for a certificate of appealability as to three 
issues relating to Erwin‟s testimony at the third trial.  We 
also granted a certificate of appealability as to two issues 
relating to the trial judge‟s in camera conference with the 
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single juror. 
II. 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over 
Ross‟s petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254.  We 
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.  
Because the District Court “relied exclusively on the 
state court record and did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing, our review is plenary.”  Palmer v. Hendricks, 
592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010).   “We review the 
decision of the state court under the same standard that 
the District Court was required to apply.”  Saranchak v. 
Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 A district court‟s authority to review a state court‟s 
denial of post-conviction relief is limited by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  
Because the PCRA Court denied Ross‟s PCRA Petition 
on the merits, we may grant habeas relief only if the 
PCRA Court‟s adjudication of Ross‟s claims “resulted in 
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States; or . . . in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
 
 “This is a difficult to meet and highly 
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deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 
which demands that state-court decisions be given the 
benefit of the doubt.”  Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
III. 
 Ross raises three Sixth Amendment claims arising 
out of the introduction of Erwin‟s testimony from the 
second trial, arguing that:  (1) he was denied his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause when Erwin‟s prior 
testimony was read into the record; (2) he was denied his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause when the trial 
court excluded Thornton‟s testimony; and (3) he was 
denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when 
trial counsel failed to present evidence of Erwin‟s crimen 
falsi conviction for making a false report to law 
enforcement. 
A. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Under 
the Confrontation Clause, “[A] witness‟s testimony 
against a defendant is [ ] inadmissible unless the witness 
appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the 
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defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 
2527, 2531 (2009).  Here, Erwin did not appear at the 
third trial.  In order for his testimony from the second 
trial to have been admissible:  (1) Erwin must have been 
“unavailable;” and (2) Ross must have “had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”3  Id. 
Whether a witness is available to testify is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  See McCandless v. Vaughn, 
172 F.3d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1999).  The PCRA Court 
concluded that Erwin refused to testify as a factual 
matter, and that he was thus unavailable as a matter of 
law.  Ross first argues as a factual matter that Erwin did 
not actually refuse to testify.  Ross points to portions of 
Erwin‟s testimony on cross-examination where Erwin 
suggested that he might, in fact, testify if he were ordered 
to do so.   
The existence of contrary evidence, however, does 
not render the PCRA Court‟s determination unreasonable 
in light of the evidence presented.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 251-52 (3d 
                                                 
3
 The Confrontation Clause separately requires that the 
Government have made a good faith effort to produce the 
witness at trial.  See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-
25 (1968).  Ross has not questioned the Government‟s 
good faith effort in this case.  
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Cir. 2004) (upholding a factual determination by a PCRA 
Court despite the existence of evidence contradicting the 
determination).  There were ample statements in the 
record from which the PCRA Court could reasonably 
have concluded that Erwin would not testify if called to 
do so.  Under AEDPA, it is not the place of a federal 
court to reweigh the evidence, when the state court‟s 
determination is supported by the record.  Moreover, on 
redirect, Erwin explained that he had not understood 
Ross‟s questions during cross-examination, and that he 
would in fact refuse to testify even if ordered to do so.  
See Trial Tr. at 117:14-22.
4
 
Ross also argues that the PCRA Court erred as a 
matter of law by concluding that Erwin‟s refusal to 
testify was sufficient to render him unavailable within the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  Rather, Ross 
argues that the trial court had an obligation to order 
Erwin to testify under threat of sanctions.  Only if Erwin 
                                                 
4
 The trial judge‟s unavailability determination also 
appears to have been informed by non-verbal cues that 
the judge was able to observe.  For instance, the trial 
judge stated that he “noticed Mr. Erwin winking at Mr. 
Ross.  They can play all the games they want.”  Trial Tr. 
120:17-19.  Under these circumstances, it would be 
especially inappropriate to overturn the PCRA Court‟s 
conclusion based on a few statements in the transcript, 
considered in isolation. 
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refused to comply with the court order, Ross argues, 
would he be unavailable for Confrontation Clause 
purposes. 
The Confrontation Clause does not require a 
witness to face the threat of sanctions in order to be 
rendered unavailable.  A witness is unavailable for 
Confrontation Clause purposes when he or she refuses to 
testify, regardless of whether the refusal is in response to 
an order to testify under threat of sanctions.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Reed, 227 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 
1991); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1102 (6th Cir. 
1983).  Ross points to no Supreme Court precedent to the 
contrary.  The PCRA Court‟s conclusion thus was not an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
B. 
 As discussed above, in order for Erwin‟s testimony 
from the second trial to have been admissible: (1) Erwin 
must have been “unavailable” and (2) Ross must have 
“had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.  As to the second 
requirement, the Confrontation Clause requires that a 
defendant have had “a full and fair opportunity to probe 
and expose [testimonial] infirmities” of an unavailable 
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government witness in order for that witness‟s prior 
testimony to be admissible.  United States v. Owens, 484 
U.S. 554, 558 (1988) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 
474 U.S. 15 (1985)).  Ross argues that he did not have a 
“full and fair opportunity” to cross-examine Erwin at the 
second trial because he was unable to question Erwin 
about Thornton‟s testimony, and that his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause were violated when Erwin‟s 
testimony was introduced at his third trial.
5
   
In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant may be denied a full 
and fair opportunity to cross-examine a government 
witness where the defendant is precluded from showing 
“why [that witness] might have been biased or otherwise 
                                                 
5
 Ross also takes issue with the trial judge‟s evidentiary 
determination that Thornton‟s testimony was 
inadmissible under Pennsylvania law.  The Supreme 
Court has “stated many times that „federal habeas corpus 
relief does not lie for errors of state law.‟”  Swarthout v. 
Cooke, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (quoting 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)).  The only 
issue appropriate for our review is whether Ross was 
deprived of his constitutional rights.  United States ex rel. 
Thomas v. Cuyler, 548 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1977).  We 
thus assume that the trial court was correct, and that 
Thornton‟s testimony was inadmissible hearsay under 
Pennsylvania law.    
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lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at 
trial.”  Id. at 318.  In Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 
(1985), however, the Supreme Court limited Davis and 
held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated 
where “the trial court did not limit the scope or nature of 
defense counsel‟s cross-examination in any way.”  Id. at 
19.   Fensterer clarified that the Confrontation Clause is 
not necessarily violated where a defendant is unable to 
effectively impeach a government witness.  Rather, the 
clause may be violated where a defendant‟s inability to 
impeach is attributable to a limitation on the scope or 
nature of the cross-examination imposed by the trial 
court.   
The Supreme Court bolstered this more limited 
reading of the Confrontation Clause in Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), holding that “the right to 
confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent 
improper restrictions on the types of questions that 
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination.”  Id. 
at 52.  The Supreme Court noted that “[n]ormally the 
right to confront one‟s accusers is satisfied if defense 
counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question 
witnesses.” Id. at 53.  Ultimately, the court held, the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned primarily with 
“specific statutory or court-imposed restriction[s] at trial 
on the scope of questioning.”  Id. at 53-54.   
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Other courts of appeals have adopted the vision of 
the Confrontation Clause expounded in Fensterer and 
Ritchie.  See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 
1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2011) (declining to find a 
Confrontation Clause violation where a defendant‟s 
inability to cross-examine a witness on a particular point 
was not attributable to the trial court (citing Fensterer, 
474 U.S. at 19)); Middlebrooks v. Bell, 619 F.3d 526, 542 
(6th Cir. 2010) (noting that Ritchie held that where “the 
trial court permit[s a defendant‟s] attorney to cross 
examine [a witness] with no limitations aside from 
routine evidentiary rulings, it [does] not impinge on his 
confrontation rights”); Rizzo v. Smith, 528 F.3d 501, 506 
(7th Cir. 2008) (noting that Ritchie held that “„the right to 
confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent 
improper restrictions on the types of questions that 
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination‟” 
(quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52)); United States v. Mejia, 
448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same); Dorsey v. 
Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(declining to find a Confrontation Clause violation where 
the defendant “was not prohibited from pursuing any line 
of inquiry, but strategically chose not to”).   
We agree with our sister circuits, and hold that 
Ross was not denied a “full and fair opportunity” to 
cross-examine Erwin.  There were no “specific statutory 
or court-imposed restriction[s] . . . on the scope of 
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questioning” at Ross‟s second trial.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 
53-54.  If Ross had discovered Thornton‟s testimony 
prior to the second trial, he could have cross-examined 
Erwin about that testimony.  Ross‟s failure to cross-
examine Erwin about Thornton‟s testimony cannot be 
attributed to any decision by the court, or statutory 
limitation on the scope or nature of Erwin‟s cross-
examination at the second trial.  Under Fensterer and 
Ritchie, Ross had what the Confrontation Clause 
guaranteed—“an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 
wish.”  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) 
(quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20).  Ross‟s claim is 
simply not a cognizable Confrontation Clause claim.
6
 
We also consider it significant that when the trial 
judge declared Erwin unavailable, the judge had not been 
informed of any newly-discovered evidence.  Only after 
                                                 
6
 Were we to adopt Ross‟s argument, the prior testimony 
of any unavailable witness would be rendered 
inadmissible upon finding any newly-discovered 
impeachment evidence.  If, for example, a critical 
government witness died before trial, a defendant would 
merely have to uncover a prior inconsistent statement to 
render that witness‟s prior testimony inadmissible.  
Fensterer makes clear that the Confrontation Clause does 
not require such a result. 
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Erwin had been excused, his testimony had been read 
into the record, and the Commonwealth had rested its 
case, did trial counsel raise the issue of Thornton‟s 
testimony.
7
  The timing of counsel‟s submission of the 
issue prevented the trial judge from asking Erwin 
whether he would be willing to testify specifically about 
Thornton‟s testimony, from declaring Erwin available for 
those purposes, or from allowing trial counsel the 
opportunity to cross-examine Erwin about the statements 
he allegedly made to Thornton. 
  Ross‟s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause 
would allow a defendant to place a trial judge in a 
difficult situation:  the judge would either have to declare 
a mistrial because the defendant‟s right to confront was 
violated, or the judge would have to delay trial to recall 
the Government witness, who may well have been 
transported back to prison, to testify about the newly-
                                                 
7
 As discussed supra in note 1, Ross‟s attorney suggested 
at oral argument that trial counsel had indeed raised the 
issue of Thornton‟s testimony before the trial judge.  The 
record does not support this claim, nor has Ross‟s 
attorney provided any support for this assertion.  Nothing 
in the record suggests that trial counsel so much as hinted 
to the trial judge of his intent to introduce newly-
discovered impeachment evidence, or to argue that Ross 
was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine Erwin at the second trial.   
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discovered evidence.  Such a result would encourage 
defendants to hide any newly-discovered evidence from a 
trial judge, creating the possibility of a Confrontation 
Clause violation that might justify reversal later down the 
line.  We decline to allow such gamesmanship where 
case law requires the opposite result. 
 This is not to say that a defendant in Ross‟s 
situation is somehow frozen in time, precluded from 
introducing newly-discovered evidence in a later trial.  
There are other constitutional avenues by which a 
defendant might introduce such newly-discovered 
evidence.  Ross may have had grounds to bring an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising out of trial 
counsel‟s failure to raise Thornton‟s testimony earlier at 
trial.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Had trial counsel raised the issue at an appropriate time, 
he may have been able to elicit from Erwin a statement 
inconsistent with his alleged statement to Thornton.  If 
counsel had elicited such a statement, Thornton‟s 
testimony may have been admissible as extrinsic 
evidence of Erwin‟s prior inconsistent statement.  See Pa. 
R. Evid. 613(b) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement by a witness is admissible only if, 
during the examination of the witness, . . . the witness is 
given an opportunity to explain or deny the making of the 
statement . . . .”), 801(c) (“„Hearsay‟ is a statement . . . 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
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asserted.”).  Instead, trial counsel chose not to raise the 
issue of Thornton‟s testimony on the record while the 
trial judge was considering Erwin‟s availability.   
Additionally, the Due Process Clause guarantees a 
defendant the “right to have clearly exculpatory evidence 
presented to the jury, at least when there is no strong 
countervailing systemic interest that justifies its 
exclusion[.]”  United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 
1204 (3d Cir. 1978).  As a result, “a defendant‟s right to 
due process can be violated by strict rules of evidence 
that prevent a defendant from presenting clearly 
exculpatory evidence to the jury[.]”  United States v. 
Mike, 655 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 2011).  A defendant in 
Ross‟s situation may be able to petition a trial judge to 
admit otherwise inadmissible evidence on due process 
grounds.  See, e.g., United States v. Prochilo, 629 F.3d 
264, 271 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting a Confrontation 
Clause claim regarding newly-discovered impeachment 
evidence on the ground that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
thus far only evaluated . . . claims like [the defendant‟s] 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.” (citing Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51-54)).  We 
do not, and cannot, opine on the merits of such claims; 
Ross has only raised and exhausted his claim under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
 Our holding today is limited to the case before us.  
We hold only that Ross was not denied his Sixth 
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Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause where 
Ross‟s inability to cross-examine Erwin about 
Thornton‟s testimony cannot be attributed to a limitation 
imposed by the trial court or by statute.  Ross had a full 
and fair opportunity to cross-examine Erwin at the 
second trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  
His Confrontation Clause rights were not violated when 
Erwin‟s prior testimony was read into the record at his 
third trial. 
C. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . 
. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Ross argues that he was denied 
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel when trial counsel failed to introduce evidence of 
Erwin‟s crimen falsi conviction for making a false report 
to law enforcement.  Under Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), a habeas petitioner claiming a 
deprivation of his or her Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel must show that:  (1) 
counsel‟s performance was deficient; and (2) counsel‟s 
deficient performance caused the petitioner prejudice.  Id. 
at 687.  “Surmounting Strickland‟s high bar is never an 
easy task.”  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1485 (2010).   
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To show deficient performance, “a person 
challenging a conviction must show that counsel‟s 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. . . .  The challenger‟s burden is to show 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the „counsel‟ guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment.”  Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. --
-, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  
There is no question that counsel‟s performance 
was deficient.  A crimen falsi conviction for false reports 
is obviously important impeachment evidence, and the 
Commonwealth concedes as much.  There is no apparent 
strategic reason that might explain or excuse counsel‟s 
mistake.  Thus, viewed objectively, Ross‟s counsel 
unreasonably failed to introduce such impeachment 
evidence.   
In addition to deficient performance, however, 
Ross must also show prejudice.  “With respect to 
prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate „a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.‟”  Richter, 131 S. 
Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “That 
requires a „substantial,‟ not just „conceivable,‟ likelihood 
of a different result.”  Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 
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131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).  “It is not enough „to show 
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding.‟”  Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  In assessing 
prejudice, a court “must consider the totality of evidence 
before the judge or jury.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 The PCRA Court concluded that there was no 
prejudice here because the Commonwealth read into the 
record Erwin‟s other crimen falsi convictions, which 
included two convictions for burglary, two convictions 
for retail theft, two convictions for receiving stolen 
property, and two convictions for theft.  There was not a 
reasonable probability, the PCRA Court concluded, that 
reading one more conviction into the record would have 
led to a different result.  Ross argues that Erwin‟s false 
reports conviction is more damaging to Erwin‟s 
credibility than his other convictions, and so its omission 
was prejudicial. 
 A false reporting conviction may well be more 
prejudicial than any one of Erwin‟s other convictions.  
Depending on the facts underlying the conviction, a jury 
might infer that the similarities between Erwin‟s previous 
false report and his report against Erwin implied that 
Erwin had lied at the second trial.  We cannot say, 
however, that the PCRA‟s conclusion was an 
unreasonable application of Strickland.  The jury was 
told that Erwin had been convicted of eight separate 
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crimes over a span of ten years.  The PCRA Court could 
reasonably have concluded that the jury already 
discredited Erwin‟s testimony to the point where the 
incremental impact of one additional conviction on 
Erwin‟s credibility was minimal.  Because the PCRA 
Court could reasonably have concluded that Ross failed 
to demonstrate prejudice, they did not unreasonably 
apply Strickland.
8
 
IV. 
 Ross raises two claims arising out of the trial 
judge‟s in camera conference with the juror, arguing that:  
(1) the trial judge denied Ross his right to a fair trial by 
giving instructions to a single juror; and (2) the trial 
judge denied Ross his right to be present at the 
                                                 
8
 Although Ross mentioned in his brief and at trial that 
the false reports conviction may have resulted from a 
situation very close to the testimony he delivered against 
Ross, the facts of the conviction would not have been 
disclosed to the jury—they would simply have been told 
the name of the offense and the date of conviction.  The 
crime of “making a false report to law enforcement” is 
vague and can be interpreted in different ways.  A juror 
may reasonably conclude that the offense is not 
particularly damaging as impeachment evidence. 
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conference.
9
 
A. 
 Generally, “communications between the court and 
the jury should be made in the presence of all of the 
jurors.”  United States v. Gullia, 450 F.2d 777, 779 (3d 
Cir. 1971).  Impermissibly influencing an individual juror 
may violate a criminal defendant‟s “Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury[.]”  United 
States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1392 (3d Cir. 1994).  Just 
because a judge has a conversation with a single juror, 
however, does not mean that the judge has committed 
constitutional error.  Rather, as we emphasized in United 
States v. Rabb, 450 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), 
whether or not the judge‟s conversation constitutes 
reversible error depends on the nature of the conversation 
and the “extent and type” of any additional instructions.  
Id. at 343-44. 
                                                 
9
 Ross also raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
arising out of trial counsel‟s failure to raise these two 
issues.  We have held, however, that “counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.”  
Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 202 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Because we conclude that Ross‟s right to be present and 
to a fair trial were not violated here, Ross‟s trial counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to raise those claims. 
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 In Gullia, we held that a trial judge erred where he 
held a conference with a juror who suggested that she 
might want to hold out and not vote guilty.  The trial 
judge told her that if she held out, “we have just wasted 
two weeks” and gave the juror extensive, substantive 
instructions regarding the legal standards at issue in the 
case.  Gullia, 450 F.2d at 778-79.  In Rabb, on the other 
hand, the judge did not elaborate on the evidence, and 
merely informed the juror that his recollection of the 
evidence controlled.  Rabb, 450 F.2d at 343.  As a result, 
we declined to find reversible error.  Id.   
 The trial judge‟s conference with the juror here is 
far closer to the conduct upheld in Rabb.  The judge did 
not elaborate on any evidence, and repeatedly 
emphasized that it was the juror‟s job to weigh the 
evidence presented at trial to reach a verdict.  At no point 
did the juror, like the juror in Gullia, equivocate on the 
issue of Ross‟s guilt.  Rather, the juror repeated that she 
believed Ross was guilty, but that she was afraid to 
deliver a verdict out of fear of retribution.
10
  The trial 
                                                 
10
 Even if the instructions here were closer to those in 
Gullia, we could not reverse.  The PCRA Court 
concluded that the judge‟s conversation with the juror 
was not an “additional instruction” that might justify 
habeas relief because “there was no communication with 
the juror as to her thought process [n]or were additional 
instructions being given.”  App‟x 253.  AEDPA only 
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judge‟s conversation with the juror did not “directly or 
indirectly refer to the specifics of the case, [was] 
collateral to the issues under consideration, and [was] not 
capable of affecting the deliberative process in any 
manner.”  Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 
1968).  The trial court thus did not err by conferencing 
with the single juror in the absence of the rest of the jury.   
B. 
 Ross argues that he had a constitutional right to be 
present at the in camera conference.  The Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee a criminal defendant the right “to be present in 
his own person whenever his presence has a relation, 
reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity 
to defend against the charge.”11  Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 
                                                                                                             
allows us to reverse if the PCRA Court‟s conclusion 
results, among other things, in an unreasonable 
application of “clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Ross has pointed to no Supreme 
Court precedent which was unreasonably applied here. 
 
11
 A similar right to be present exists under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but that 
right is implicated only “where the defendant is  . . . 
actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.”  
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(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 
(1934)).  “This does not mean, however, that the 
defendant has a „constitutional right to be present at 
every interaction between a judge and a juror.‟”  Bertoli, 
40 F.3d at 1397 (quoting United States v. Gagnon, 470 
U.S. 522, 526 (1985)).  Rather, the defendant‟s right to 
be present extends to “any stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if [the 
defendant‟s] presence would contribute to the fairness of 
the procedure.”  Stincer, 482 U.S. at 754.  There is no 
constitutional right to be present “when presence would 
be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.”  Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934), overruled on 
other grounds in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 Gagnon is instructive.  There, a criminal defendant 
in a multi-defendant trial was seen sketching portraits of 
the jury during the trial.  A juror expressed a safety 
concern over the incident.  The trial judge held an in 
camera conference with the juror, in the presence of 
counsel for the defendant who was seen sketching the 
portraits, but excluding the defendants themselves.  On 
appeal, the defendants claimed that they were denied 
their Fifth Amendment right to be present at the 
                                                                                                             
United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985).  The 
conference in this case involved no evidence against 
Ross, and his challenge thus arises strictly out of the Due 
Process Clause. 
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conference.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
the defendants‟ presence “was not required to ensure 
fundamental fairness or a reasonably substantial . . . 
opportunity to defend against the charge.”  Gagnon, 470 
U.S. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The Court emphasized that the defendant whose 
conduct had resulted in the conference had counsel 
present.  Id.; see also United States v. Fernandez-
Hernandez, 652 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding no 
Due Process violation where counsel was present at in 
camera conference with juror); United States v. McCoy, 
8 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). Additionally, as 
the court observed, the defendants “could have done 
nothing had they been at the conference, nor would they 
have gained anything by attending.  Indeed, the presence 
of [the defendants] . . . could have been 
counterproductive.”  Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527; see also 
United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 
2004) (finding no due process violation where a 
defendant‟s presence at an in camera conference “may 
have prevented juror number three from speaking 
openly”). 
 The facts here are virtually indistinguishable from 
Gagnon.  A juror expressed concerns about her safety.  
The trial judge held a conference to discuss matters 
extraneous to the questions at issue at trial.  Ross‟s 
counsel was present to ensure that nothing prejudicial 
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was said.  Ross‟s presence would not have contributed to 
the fairness of the proceeding, and may well have been 
counterproductive, given that the juror was expressing 
concern about possible retaliation.  Ross‟s Fifth 
Amendment rights were thus not violated by the trial 
judge‟s decision to hold the conference without his 
presence.
12
 
V. 
 The writ of habeas corpus “is an extraordinary 
form of relief and is granted only to remedy 
constitutional error.”  Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dept. of Corr., 
                                                 
12
 The PCRA Court and the District Court denied Ross‟s 
claim on the basis that the conference with a juror was 
not a “critical” stage at trial because the jury already 
indicated it had reached a verdict.  Ross argues on appeal 
that because the verdict had not yet been recorded, the 
jurors were free to change their minds and so the verdict 
was not yet final.  Ross is correct, and the 
Commonwealth appears to concede as much.  
Nonetheless, “we can affirm a judgment on the merits on 
an alternative basis[.]”  Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 
299, 318 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001).  Even if the conference was 
“critical,” Gagnon makes clear that Ross did not have a 
Fifth Amendment right to be present at the conference 
because his presence would not have contributed to the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding. 
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645 F.3d 650, 656 (3d Cir. 2011).  Ross has not shown 
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights under the 
theories that he has advanced.  We will affirm.
13
 
                                                 
13
 Because we conclude that there was no error, we need 
not consider whether any errors were harmless. 
